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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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INC., a Utah corporation, and 
LESLIE W. VAN ANTWERP, JR., doing 
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Defendants, Appellants, and 
Cross-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
AND CROSS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
This case includes claims for declaratory judgment, 
unlawful detainer, damages and accounting. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist, sitting without a 
jury, entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Judgment and Decree which set the rental for the first 
renewal term of the lease at $900 per month, found that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appellant was in unlawful detention of the premises for 
breach of lease covenants, awarded damages, ordered that an 
accounting be made and that appellant vacate the premises as 
of January 15, 1976. Appellant's Motion for. Reconsideration 
of Judgment was denied. The Judgment and Decree was appealed 
by defendant, and plaintiffs cross-appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL 
Plaintiffs, respondents, and cross-appellants 
request this Court to reverse, modify or affirm the trial 
court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
and Decree as follows: 
1. Reverse and delete Finding of Fact No. 59, 
which reads, "The uncertain lease situation is not the type 
that the legislature had in mind in fixing treble damages 
for unlawful holdover." 
2. Modify Findings of Fact Nos. 60 and 64 to 
permit respondents to recover treble damages for unlawful 
holdover of the premises from and after March 4, 1975, to 
and including January 15, 1976, pursuant to Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, §78-36-1, et seq. 
3. Reverse part of Conclusion of Law No. 16 and 
all of Conclusion of Law No. 18(k) so as to permit the 
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recovery of treble damages from and after March 4, 1975, to 
and including January 15, 1976, for unlawful holdover of the 
premises. 
4. Modify part of Conclusion of Law No. 14 and 
all of Conclusion of Law No. 18(g) so as to award respondents 
treble damages for unlawful holdover of the premises from 
and after March 4, 1975, to January 15, 1976. 
5. Modify paragraphs No. 2 and No. 5 of the 
Judgment and Decree so as to award respondents and cross-
appellants judgment for treble damages as a result of the 
unlawful holdover. 
6. Reverse and delete paragraph No. 6 of the 
Judgment and Decree. 
7. Affirm the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment and Decree in all other respects. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs, respondents, and cross-appellants 
(hereinafter referred to as "respondents'1) disagree with 
defendant, appellant, and cross-respondentfs (hereinafter 
referred to as "appellant11) Statement of Facts in several 
material respects. The controlling facts in the view of the 
respondents are set forth below. 
- 3 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The respondents are the owners of a restaurant 
located at 5418 South 1900 West, Roy, Utah (T.190, Complaint 
para. 1-4, Answer para. 1-4). This property is located 
within the main Roy City shopping district (T.191). Respon-
dents1 predecessor-in-interest, Ma's & Pa's Place, a Utah 
corporation ("Ma's & Pa's"), operated this restaurant until 
sometime during 1967 or 1968 (T.174, 205). 
The restaurant building was erected in 1948 (T.205) 
on a lot 225 feet deep and 158 feet wide fronting on the 
east side of 1900 West (T.208, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). This 
street is the main north-south thoroughfare in Roy, Utah 
(T.355). Within a block to the north of the premises is the 
Riverdale Road junction, and to the south is the Roy 1-15 
exit (T.190, 355). 
To the south is located a Denny's restaurant, Roy 
Lumber Company, Taco Time, the Rainbow Bar, a gas station 
and a motel. On the north side is D & B Garage and at the 
Riverdale Road junction, Roy Auto (T.217, 218). Up until 
the time Ma's & Pa's ceased operating the restaurant, it was 
the only restaurant in the immediate vicinity on the east 
side of the street (T.218). 
The premises were subsequently leased to the Hicks 
to operate a Tampico restaurant (T.175, 205, 372). This 
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lease was for a five year term with rentals of $1,000 per 
month (T.175, 205, 206). After the business had been operating 
approximately seven months, the Hicks took out bankruptcy 
(T.206). 
The Continental Group of Utah, Inc. ("Continental11) , 
had obtained a national "Paul Bunyan" restaurant franchise 
(T.191, 192, 274). On September 12, 1969, the respondents 
entered into an Earnest Money Lease Agreement with Continental 
to lease the premises for a five year term, plus two five-
year renewal options (T.177, 239). The Earnest Money Agree-
ment provided for rentals of $500 per month, plus 3 percent 
of the gross sales over $10,000 per month for the initial 
five year period. In succeeding renewal periods, the base 
rent was left at $500 per month while the percentage rental 
was increased to 4 percent of gross sales over $10,000 per 
month (Defendant's Exhibit 1). 
After the Earnest Money Agreement had been executed, 
Continental revised the Hicks-Tampico lease (T.175-177), and 
this revised lease was executed by the parties on September 
24, 1969 (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A). Contrary to the terms of 
the Earnest Money Agreement, this lease called for the rene-
gotiation of the rentals for each successive renewal term 
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with the proviso that the maximum monthly rent be fixed at 
$900 per month. In addition, Continental negotiated for and 
obtained the right to terminate the lease upon 90 days 
notice (T.211, para. 4 of Exhibit C to Plaintiffs' Exhibit A) 
in the event it was unable to make more than $10,000 per 
month (T.211). In fact, Continental represented to Ma's & 
Pa's that it would vacate the premises if gross sales dropped 
below $10,000 per month (T.211) since the corporation would 
be losing money at that sales level. This was agreeable to 
Ma's & Pa's since it was losing money by renting the premises 
for less than $900 per month (T.212). 
At the time Continental obtained possession of the 
premises, they were in good condition (T.199, 244, 269-270, 
277-278). Although the building had been constructed in 
1948 (T.205), the exterior had recently been repainted and 
the building interior had been completely remodeled and 
repainted by the Hicks (T.198). During the Hicks occupancy, 
there had been a small fire in the kitchen (T.199). Follow-
ing the Hicks occupancy, the building was completely cleaned 
and scrubbed down (T.199-200). The floors and the paint 
were in good condition and repair (T.200, 277), and the 
restrooms were in good repair and in operation (T.200, 243-
245). 
- 6 -
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The interior decor of the building did not suit 
Continental. It undertook at its own cost (T.202) to remodel 
the main dining room and the coffee shop, remove the upstairs 
dance floor, relocate the public restrooms, and add a walk-
in box (T.201-202, 240-242). 
Continental was to do the necessary remodeling and 
maintain all things in the restaurant. !f[W]e would take 
care of everything. If there was [sic] any repairs to be 
done, or anything like that we would take care of them, and 
we did." (T.240) 
The original lease between Continental and Ma's & 
Pa's did not include glassware, silverware and other items. 
Continental anticipated receiving these items as part of the 
franchise package. When it was determined that these items 
were not part of the franchise, Continental arranged to 
lease these items, which had an original cost in excess of 
$10,000 (T.222), from Ma's & Pa's for $25 per month (T.193, 
248-49, Plaintiffs' Exhibit M). As a part of the leases, 
the sum of $1,500 was placed on deposit in the Bank of Utah 
to cover breakage, loss, damage and the last month's rent 
(T.223-224, 249, 270-272, 380). 
During the time Continental operated a restaurant 
on the premises, the Roy City Fire Department notified them 
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that exterior fire exits needed to be installed on the 
second floor (T.252-253, 325, Plaintiffs' Exhibits N and W). 
Although the premises had been inspected by the Roy City 
Fire Department on several prior occasions, no mention had 
ever been made of the need for second floor fire exits 
(T.251-253, 325). Roy City had adopted a new fire code in 
1965 (T.324); however, since the building had been built 
prior to 1965, no new fire exits were required (T.327) until 
the fire chief concluded the existing conditions constituted 
a distinct hazard to life and property (T.328). 
This change occurred in 1972 due to the fact the 
second floor was being used by a new business for a new and 
different use (T.324, 328, 331, 332). At trial, Mrs. Rizzuto, 
the secretary-treasurer of Continental, testified that Ma's 
& Pa's was never notified of this problem since "we figured 
that was our responsibility to put it up there." (T.251) 
In May, 1972, Continental sold their business to 
appellant (T.249), who assumed all of their leasehold and 
other obligations (T.249, 254, Plaintiffs' Exhibits U and V, 
Defendant's Exhibit 2). 
Prior to the sale, appellant inspected the premises 
and reviewed the operations with Mr. and Mrs. Rizzuto on 
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several different occasions (T.250-251), Appellant was 
informed of the obligation to pay the monthly bills after 
June 1, 1972, rental on the glassware and dishes (T.265), 
and to repair and keep up the premises (T.254). It was 
specifically pointed out to him that the kitchen floor 
(T.256) needed to be repaired and that the fire escapes 
(T.251) had to be installed. And, as the Weber County 
Health Inspectors testified, there were other items which 
needed to be corrected about the time appellant took over 
the lease (T.310-312). Prior to that time, the inspectors 
had noted only that the floors were in bad shape and a 
lavatory sink was in poor repair (T.311). And, as Mrs. 
Rizzuto indicated, it was the kitchen floors that needed 
repair (T.256). 
During the time Continental operated the restaurant, 
their monthly gross sales had been seasonally improving. In 
fact, during the 20 month period of time for which records 
were available, they failed to pay percentage rental only 
twice. Their monthly sales (T.259-262) were: 
Month Gross Sales 
October, 1970 $ 13,216 
November, 1970 13,241 
December, 1970 13,000 
January, 1971 12,616 
- 9 -
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February, 1971 
March, 1971 
April, 1971 
May, 1971 
June 1 to 20, 1971 
July 6 to 31, 1971 
August, 1971 
September, 1971 
October, 1971 
November, 1971 
December, 1971 
January, 1972 
February, 1972 
March, 1972 
April, 1972 
May, 1972 
12,870 
15,231 
13,522 
15,051 
7,355 
8,096 
- 11,200 
11,233 
12,800 
13,044 
15,211 
11,821 
13,044 
17,242 
16,425 
15,529 
Prior to October, 1970, Continental had experienced a few 
months in which gross sales were less than $10,000 per month 
(T.257). Throughout this period, Continental had periodi-
cally increased its food prices to offset rising food costs 
due to inflation (T.266-268). 
In this context, Ma's & Pa's consented and per-
mitted Continental to assign their leasehold and other 
obligations to appellant (Plaintiffs' Exhibit B). Although 
appellant took over a going business, his monthly gross 
sales started an immediate decline. If appellant's monthly 
gross sales are compared with Continental's monthly gross 
sales for the corresponding months of each prior year for 
which records are available, his monthly gross sales exceed 
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those of Continental only in the months of June, 1973, and 
June, 1974. And, he did not p 
records indicate the following 
(T.284-288): 
Month 
June, 1972 
July, 1972 
August, 1972 
September, 1972 
October, 1972 
November, 1972 
December, 1972 
January, 1973 
February, 1973 
March, 1973 
April, 1973 
May, 1973 
June, 1973 
July, 1973 
August, 1973 
September, 1973 
October, 1973 
November, 1973 
December, 1973 
January, 1974 
February, 1974 
March, 1974 
April, 1974 
May, 1974 
June, 1974 
July, 1974 
August, 1974 
September, 1974 
During this time, app 
percent rise in food costs (T.2 
iy any percentage rental. His 
monthly gross sales pattern 
Sales 
$ 11 
7 
10, 
9, 
9 
9 
11; 
6 
9, 
9 
8 
11 
7 
6 
8 
7 
10 
10 
12 
7 
8 
10 
10 
11 
7 
7 
8 
7 
,221.31 
540.01 
805.78 
074.00 
100.00 
,033.00 
,100.00 
,837.00 
,004.00 
,755.00 
,933.00 
,705.00 
,433.00 
,078.00 
,202.00 
,320.00 
,458.00 
,116.00 
,174.00 
,327.00 
,514.00 
,507.00 
,193.00 
,608.00 
,890.00 
,229.00 
,240.00 
,725.00 
llant also experienced an 81 
9, Plaintiffs * Exhibit Y). 
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He offset this by increasing his prices or by using smaller 
portions of food (T.290-292, 441-442). This is readily 
shown by the relatively stable ratio of cost of goods sold 
to gross sales (T.442). 
An examination of appellantfs books and records by 
respondents' accountant disclosed that the restaurant operated 
at a net loss during 1973 and 1974 (T.438-439). Since 
appellant's tax returns for 1972 showed major adjustments 
for accounts receivable and accounts payable not otherwise 
reflected in their books and records, it was impossible to 
determine whether the restaurant operated at a net profit or 
loss during the period (T.437,440). Appellant attributed his 
immediate decline in monthly gross sales to the ending of 
the Vietnam War during the latter part of 1972 (T.384). 
During appellant's occupancy, more repair items 
were noted on the health inspectors1 reports (T.304-309, 
312, 315-318, Plaintiffs' Exhibits AA and BB). As the lease 
neared an end, an inspection of the premises by the respon-
dents revealed the exterior paint on the building had de-
teriorated to the point bare wood was exposed (T.180, 345, 
354), the furnace room plaster had fallen or been knocked 
off where the air conditioner had been removed (T.180, 
- 12 -
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338-340, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit C), several broken windows had 
not been replaced (T.180, 340), the front door had no handle 
and hadn't been painted (T.181, 354, 393-394), the lights in 
the entrance hall did not work (T.181), the interior paint 
was in poor condition (T.181, 345-346), the floor behind the 
living room staircase and along the serving table was in 
disrepair (T.181), wallpaper and tile were loose in the 
former coffee shop room (T.181), the kitchen freezer compart-
ment walls were falling apart (T.181, 339. 386-387, Plain-
tiffs1 Exhibits E and G), the bathroom basins and fixtures 
needed to be cleaned and repaired (T.181, 315, 389, Plain-
tiffs1 Exhibit F), the kitchen dishwashing area floor needed 
repair (T.182, 307, 315, 339, 341, 354, 390), the kitchen 
walls needed to be cleaned and painted (T.182, 345-346), the 
dumbwaiter did not operate and the dumbwaiter had a 2 ' x 3! 
hole in the wall (T.182), the public restroom floor tile was 
in bad shape and there were holes in the walls (T.182-183, 
315-316, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit D), the shrubbery was dying for 
lack of care (T.185), the basement drain needed to be fixed 
(T.185), and the walls, ceiling and fixtures in the blocked 
off restrooms were broken or knocked out (T.185). 
Appellant testified he was finished with the 
business (T.398) and intended to get out of the business by 
- 11 -
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selling it back to the respondents (T.399) or subleasing it 
with an option to buy to a new operator (T.422). It was in 
this context that appellant intended to renew the lease for 
a subsequent term (T.177) and that respondent informed the 
appellant that commencing October 1, 1974, his monthly rent 
would be $900 per month (T.178, Defendant's Exhibit 3). 
During the months of March through September, 
1974, the respondents and appellant met together several 
times to renegotiate the rent (T.178, 179). Among the 
factors respondents discussed were the rising costs of living 
and the fact they were realizing little or no profit from 
their investment (T.178, 375). Appellant claimed he wasn't 
making enough money to pay any increased rent and he wouldn't 
pay more rent (T.179, 376). During their discussions as the 
lease neared the end, the respondents pointed out to appellant 
that he had not been maintaining the building in a good 
state of repair (T.179-180) and served upon him their demand 
(T.184, 185, Plaintiffs' Exhibit I) that the maintenance and 
repairs therein specified be completed within 30 days or the 
lease would be terminated and forfeited pursuant to para-
graph 20 of the lease (T.186, Plaintiffs' Exhibit A). 
Appellant responded to the demand by letter dated 
October 15, 1974, denying for the most part that any repairs 
- 14 -
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or maintenance was needed. During a meeting between the 
parties in the office of Mr. King in early November, 1974, 
the appellant replied that he would make the repairs he 
thought were needed when he felt like it (T/187). He later 
stated he had no obligation to spend a large amount of money 
to keep the premises in good repair until the monthly rental 
had been renegotiated (T.388, 397). 
The lease rent for each renewal period was to be 
renegotiated based on !f[f] actors of tax increases, cost of 
business increases or decreases, business volume and success, 
and insurance costs and other reasonable allowances.!f 
(Exhibit D to Plaintiffs' Exhibit A) 
At this point no agreement had been reached fixing 
a new monthly rental. Further correspondence was exchanged 
regarding the factors each party thought should control in 
arriving at a new monthly rental. The appellant pointed out 
that no increased rent was warranted because: 
(a) real property taxes had declined 6 
percent over the past three years; 
(b) personal property taxes had remained the 
same; 
(c) the cost of doing business had risen 81 
percent; and 
- 15 -
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(d) business volume had declined 24 percent 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibits K, Y and Z). 
At trial, appellant pointed out that the leased machinery 
and equipment was in constant need of repairs and he had 
unceasing expenses (T.385, 388). This, however, is not borne 
out by his books and records (Plaintiffs1 Exhibits FF, GG, 
HH and II). 
The respondents replied saying they sought a fair 
rate of return on their investment and that, all factors 
considered, it should be over $900 per month. They believed 
this was warranted based on 
(a) the annual depreciation assuming the 
building was replaced at current costs; 
(b) the current rental per square foot of 
the space paid by similar businesses; and 
(c) the annual return one would receive if 
the property were sold and the proceeds invested in 
interest bearing accounts (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit C). 
Although further correspondence was exchanged 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibits L, P and Q and Defendant's Exhibit 5), 
no agreement was reached. During this period of time, Roy 
City informed appellant that fire exits had to be installed 
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in the second floor before his business license would be 
renewed in March, 1975, for use of the second floor (Plain-
tiffs1 Exhibit N). Appellant in turn demanded that respon-
dents undertake to install and pay for the fire exits (Defen-
dant's Exhibit 5), which they refused to do (Plaintiffs1 
Exhibit 0). Appellant estimated loss of business from being 
unable to use the second floor was 10 to 20 percent (T.386). 
However, starting in April, 1975, appellant's business 
records are unavailable (T.426). 
On February 14, 1976, it appeared to respondents 
that no resolution of the matter could be reached, and they 
served notice on appellant's counsel that the lease was 
terminated and forfeited for failure to make repairs and 
directed that the premises be vacated within five days 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit Q). Appellant was also personally 
served with the same notice to vacate the premises on Febru-
ary 26, 1976 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit R). The respondents 
instituted suit on February 26, 1976, to obtain judicial 
resolution of the matter (Complaint). 
On May 10, 1975, respondents filed a Motion for 
Judgment on the pleadings contending that the renewal option 
was void for vagueness, and oral argument was held on May 20, 
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1975. On May 29, 1975, Judge Hyde ruled that the renewal 
option was sufficiently certain that it was not void as a 
matter of law. Respondents subsequently filed an Amended 
Complaint realleging the original allegations and adding 
allegations for unlawful detainer, damages, and accounting 
(Amended Complaint). 
As the trial date neared, appellant covered up the 
holes in the kitchen and restroom walls with formica and, in 
the process, lowered the restroom ceiling (T.387-388, 414). 
However, there is no evidence indicating that sheetrock was 
first installed as required by the Roy City fire code (T.341). 
At trial, a real estate broker testified that a 
fair rental for the premises, assuming the maintenance and 
repairs had been made and the tenant was paying the taxes 
and insurance, was between $800 and $1,000 per month (T.362). 
In fixing the monthly rent, the lessee would be seeking to 
fix his costs over a period of time (T.367) and the lessors 
would be gambling on the fact the rental property value and 
so on would not increase to the point they would be losing 
money (T.367). In determining what to accept as a monthly 
rent, the lessors would set the base monthly rent at the 
very minimum they could get by with to help the person 
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establish himself in the business (T.369). In so doing, the 
lessors would consider the value of their investment in the 
property, the rate of return they would be getting from the 
monthly income, who would take care of the maintenance, who 
would be paying the taxes and insurance, and the fair rental 
value of the property (T.369-371). Respondents felt that 
such a monthly minimum base rent should be $1,000, but they 
were limited by the lease to a maximum of $900 per month 
(T.190). 
The lease calls for the respondents to pay the 
general property taxes and maintain fire and hazard insurance 
covering the building (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A). The respon-
dents paid the following general property taxes: 1969, 
$2,046.94; 1970, $2,549.14; 1971, $2,083.63; 1972, $2,163.06; 
1973, $2,085.23; and 1974, $2,030.80. The property was 
reappraised on or about March 27, 1974 (T.335), and, based 
on the reappraisal, taxes for 1975 were fixed at $2,212.51 
(T.297). As a result of the reappraisal, the building 
assessed value increased from $14,040 to $15,740 (T.299), 
the real property assessed value increased from $5,720 to 
$15,540 (T.299), and the personal property increased from 
$1,000 in 1969 to $1,300 in 1975 (T.300). In Utah, all 
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property is assessed at 20 percent of fair market value (T.336). 
During 1975, the annual insurance premium was $828 (T.233). 
The estimated cost to repair and correct the 
maintenance deficiencies was $4,564, $1,940 estimated by the 
painter (T.347) and $2,624 estimated by the general contractor 
(T.339). 
The matter was tried before the Honorable John F. 
Wahlquist on December 16, 1975. Judge Wahlquist rendered a 
Memorandum Decision December 30, 1975, and directed that 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Judgment and 
Decree be prepared for entry which reflected the unlawful 
holdover of appellant, fixed delayed maintenance at $4,000, 
set the monthly rental at $900 per month, and awarded damages 
in the sum of $900 per month from and after October 1, 1974, 
to January 15, 1976. The Court refused to award treble 
damages for unlawful detainer, but ordered appellant to 
vacate the premises on or before January 15, 1976. No 
judgment was rendered against Continental. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CON-
CLUDING THAT THE LEASE RENEWAL OPTIONS WERE NOT VOID. 
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A lease is both a grant of an estate in land and a 
contract for the possession and use thereof by the lessee in 
return for payment to the lessor of compensation or rent. 
State v. Rawson, 210 Ore. 593, 312 P.2d 849, 853 (1957). If 
a contract is not definite and certain with respect to all 
essential terms, it is void for lack of certainty and cannot 
be specifically enforced. D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Brown, 439 
F.2d 926, 929 (10 Cir. 1969); Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 
61, 362 P.2d 427, 428-29 (1961). 
The lease provides that rents for each renewal 
term will be renegotiated based on factors of tax increases, 
cost of business increases and decreases, business volume 
and success, and insurance costs and other reasonable al-
lowances . Where the renewal option leaves for future nego-
tiation the formula and the factors making up the formula, 
which is the situation presently before the Court, such a 
renewal option has been declared unenforceable for lack of 
certainty and definiteness. Schlusselberg v. Rubin, 465 
S.W.2d 226, 227-28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); Walker v. Keith, 
382 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1966); and Young v. Sweet, 266 N.C. 623, 
146 S.E.2d 669, 670 (1966). See also, Slayter v. Pasley, 
199 Ore. 616, 264 P.2d 444, 449 (1953). 
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This view is not followed universally. Some 
jurisdictions follow the minority view that uncertainty 
notwithstanding, the parties will be deemed to have agreed 
upon a "reasonable rental11 since the renewal option was part 
of the consideration which induced the lessee to execute the 
lease. Hall v. Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, 285 
(1927); and Young v. Nelson, 121 Wash. 285, 209 P. 515, 517 
(1922). This view overlooks the fact that "a party must 
have an enforceable contract before he has a right to enforce 
it." Walker v. Keith, supra at 201; Russell v. Valentine, 
14 U.2d 26, 376 P.2d 548, 549 (1962); and Valcarce v. Bitters, 
supra. Cf., EFCO Distributing, Inc., v. Perrin, 17 U.2d 375, 
412 P.2d 615, 616 (1966). 
Appellant has not demonstrated that he had a valid 
enforceable lease renewal option. Appellant's predecessor-
in-interest, Continental, prepared the lease (T.175-177). 
In so doing, it deleted the fixed renewal rent of $500 per 
month plus 4 percent of gross sales on $10,000 per month and 
substituted a clause that called for the mere renegotiation 
of rentals with the proviso that the amount could not exceed 
$900 per month. 
If Continental had intended to commit the respon-
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dents to a fixed predetermined rent for each renewal term, 
it should have retained the formula set forth in the Earnest 
Money Agreement. This it did not do, and appellant is 
precluded at this late date from seeking a reformation of 
the agreement so to do (Para, 34 of Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A). 
The parties have engaged in extensive negotiations which 
have not resulted in an agreement on the renewal term rents• 
The parties have been unable to agree on the factors to be 
considered in making up a renewal rent formula, much less 
agree on the weight each factor should receive. In view of 
the uncertainty, vagueness, and lack of any specific renewal 
rental formula, the renewal option should be declared void 
as a matter of law. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN FINDING APPELLANT 
LIABLE FOR THE DELAYED MAINTENANCE DAMAGES. 
As appellant pointed out in his Brief at 3-4, 
upon assignment, he assumed the lease together with its 
responsibilities and obligations. There is no evidence 
affirmatively indicating that appellant did not assume the 
entire responsibility to repair the items not corrected by 
Continental during its possession of the premises, together 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with the obligation to repair and maintain the premises 
after he took possession. The trial courtfs finding that 
appellant was responsible for the maintenance and repair of 
the premises should be upheld. Radley v. Smith, 6 U.2d 314, 
313 P.2d 465, 466-67 (1957). 
Appellant's Brief points out his testimony denying 
for the most part any need for repairs and maintenance with 
respect to the premises (Brief at 10-11, T.389-395). The 
respondents introduced considerable testimony indicating 
quite the contrary (Statement of Facts, supra). 
After listening to witnesses, including appellant, 
and observing their demeanor for two full days, the trial 
court sifted through the conflicting evidence and concluded 
that appellant had not maintained or repaired the premises 
in accordance with his lease obligations and had failed to 
comply with respondents1 notice dated September 24, 1974. 
Under such circumstances, this Court should not disturb the 
trial court's findings unless a review of the evidence 
clearly preponderates against such a finding. Millard v. 
Parry, 2 U.2d 217, 271 P.2d 852, 855 (1954). This can only 
be accomplished if the appellant's testimony is believed in 
every respect, totally disregarding the testimony of respon-
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dents and of other disinterested witnesses. Respondents 
believe the record when viewed in its entirety will support 
and sustain the trial court's findings in this regard. 
In addition to these items, second floor fire 
escapes needed to be installed. The evidence shows, and the 
trial court correctly found, that this obligation belonged 
to Continental (T.251) and was assumed by the appellant. 
Appellant attempts to shift this burden to the respondents 
by reference to paragraph 15 of the lease (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibit A). This paragraph reads as follows: 
Lessor covenants that he has good and marketable 
title to the demised premises in fee simple absolute, 
subject only to existing mortgage thereon, and that 
the same is subject to no leases, tenancies, agreements, 
restrictions and defects in title affecting the demised 
premises or the rights granted Lessee in this Lease; 
and that there are no restrictive covenants, zoning 
or other ordinances or regulations applicable to the 
demised premises which will prevent Lessee from 
conducting its business. 
When the lease was executed, this covenant had 
been complied with in every respect. The building was 
constructed in 1948 (T.205) and remodeled following a fire 
prior to the effective date of the Roy City Fire Code adopted 
in 1965 (T.326, 327). Buildings then in existence did not 
have to comply with this fire code until the particular use 
made of the building by the occupant caused the fire chief 
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to certify that this use constituted a safety hazard (T.328). 
Even though Continental remodeled the second floor for 
patron eating facilities by removing the dance floor and 
installing public restroom facilities, no safety hazard 
existed by virtue of occupant's use of the building during 
1969, 1970 or 1971 (T.329). During this period of time, the 
building and the use thereof had been investigated and 
inspected by the fire department (T.329, 330). The fire 
department made no mention of the need for second floor fire 
escapes in its reports. However, during the early part of 
1972, the situation changed. The fire department again 
investigated and inspected the building and the manner it 
was being used and concluded that second floor fire escapes 
were warranted and directed their installation (T.252-253, 
325, Plaintiffs1 Exhibits N and W). 
At trial, Continental's secretary-treasurer testi-
fied it was their duty to install the second floor fire 
escapes and that appellant had been specifically informed of 
this necessity prior to the date he assumed the lease (T.251). 
In such circumstances, the burden of installing fire escapes 
properly belongs to the lessee. Lodge Room Co. v. Pacific 
Bond & Investment Co., 84 Wash. 150, 146 P. 376, 377 (1915); 
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Pross v. Excelsior Cleaning & Dyeing Co., 110 Misc. 195, 
179 NYS 176 (1910); Taylor v. Finnigan, 189 Mass. 568, 76 
N.E. 203, 205 (1905); and Johnson v. Snow, 102 Mo. App. 233, 
76 S.W. 675 (1903), Aff'd 201 Mo. 450, 100 S.W. 5 (1907). 
Cf., ELL and L. Investment Co. v. International Trust Co., 
132 Colo. 137, 286 P.2d 338 (1955). 
The lessorfs covenants contained in paragraph 15 
of the lease are not couched in language designed to impose 
a continuing obligation on lessor. It speaks of conditions 
existing only at the time the lease was executed. This is 
not a lease prepared by the respondents (T.175-177). Quite 
to the contrary, it was prepared by Continental and should 
be construed against appellant. Russell v. Valentine, supra 
at 549. The only continuing obligation imposed on respondents 
and Ma's & Pa's so far as this action is concerned is their 
duty to comply with the law as set forth in paragraph 22 of 
the lease. This they have done at all times throughout the 
term of this lease. The trial court correctly included the 
installation of second floor fire escapes as a maintenance 
deficiency. 
The appellant offered no evidence indicating that 
the repairs could be made for less than $1,940 for the 
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painter and $2,624 for the general contractor. The trial 
court concluded that such repairs would place the premises 
in better shape than they were at the time they were rented 
to Continental, but not grossly so, and reduced respondents 
damages to $4,000. 
Respondents believe the clear weight of the evi-
dence supports the trial court's findings, and the damage 
award of $4,000 against appellant should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING FURTHER 
DAMAGES BASED ON A RENTAL RATE OF $900 PER MONTH. 
Following the expiration of the original term of 
the lease, an option was granted to the lessee to renew the 
lease for two consecutive five year periods upon the same 
terms and conditions 
" . . . except that the rental amount of the lease 
will be renegotiated; however, maximum total monthly 
rental shall not exceed $900.00 per month. Factors 
of tax increases, cost of business increases or 
decreases, business volume and success, insurance 
costs and other reasonable allowances will be the 
basis for terms of negotiation.M 
Appellant has omitted reference to "costs of business in-
creases and decreases" in the factors cited on p. 13 of his 
Brief. 
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In fixing the renewal term rental at $900 per 
month and awarding damages based on this figure, the court 
had before it a fairly complete history of the business 
which had been conducted on the premises. The respondents 
have summarized this history in its Statement of Facts, 
supra. 
Appellant has directed the Court's attention to 
those factors he believes to be controlling in reversing the 
trial court's determination to fix the rent at $900 per 
month (Brief of Appellant at 12-13). The respondents will 
show that all of the specified factors in the lease do not 
favor appellant. 
The real estate taxes have increased. This increase, 
averaged over the period 1969-1974, is $112.86. The real 
property was reappraised on March 27, 1974 (T.335). The 
fair market value used by the appraisers in fixing the 
appraisal value of the property for 1975 was $162,900 (T.299, 
300, 336). Based on this reappraisal, taxes for 1975 were 
fixed at $2,212.51 (T.297). Under the terms of the lease, 
respondents paid the taxes, and the insurance which had 
increased from $795 (T.234) in 1974 to $828 (T.233) in 1975. 
There is no dispute that appellant's business 
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volume decreased (Statement of Facts, supra at 11) when 
compared to Continental's business volume (Statement of 
Facts, supra at 9). Out of the 28 months appellant operated 
the premises, only ten of those months showed gross sales in 
excess of $10,000 per month. The average gross sales for 
these ten months is $10,988.80. The average gross sales for 
the entire 28 months is $9,111.50. For the 20 month period 
reported by Continental, its average monthly gross sales 
were $13,087.35. Only two of those months were below the 
$10,000 mark and, in both of those months, Continental had 
closed its doors for employee vacations. 
Appellant's decline in volume has resulted in a 
considerable monthly rental loss to respondents, when com-
pared with Continental's volume. Continental paid percentage 
rent 18 out of 20 months (90%), while appellant paid on 10 
out of 28 months (35.7%). This drastic decline is compounded 
by the fact that appellant paid percentage rent on the 
average monthly sum of $998.80, while Continental paid 
percentage rent on the average monthly sum of $3,087.35. 
One must bear in mind that both Continental and 
appellant increased their food prices during the lease term 
to offset the rising costs of doing business attributed to 
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inflation. Appellant testified that his products had increased 
81 percent during the time he operated the restaurant. This 
increase was passed on to appellant's patrons (T.290-292, 
441-442). Respondents, while watching their monthly rental 
income drop, had no means by which to offset the inflationary 
effect on their monthly rental income. Using appellant's 81 
percent inflation figure and applying that to the $500 
monthly base rental, respondents would be justified in 
demanding and holding out for $900 per month rental. 
During the period of negotiation with appellant, 
respondents have sought to obtain a fair and reasonable 
return on their investment by increasing rentals from $500 
to $900 per month. Respondents testified that they were 
losing money by renting the premises to Continental for less 
than $900 per month (T.212). They were willing to take a 
fixed monthly rental of $500 per month and gamble on making 
up the difference on the monthly percentage rent since 
Continental represented it would give up the lease if its 
monthly gross sales were $10,000 or less. This gamble has 
not paid off in their favor, and they now seek not to be 
made completely whole, but to offset the effect of inflation, 
pass on their increased fixed expenses, and receive a fair 
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return on their investment by increasing the monthly base 
rent. 
As with any business or investment, the true 
measure of its success is the monetary return one receives 
on the time and money one has invested. Appellant's business 
has not been a success. He has lost money in 1973 and 1974. 
However, his misfortune should not be shifted to respondents. 
This is particularly true when one considers that the respon-
dents are trustees managing the property for several unspeci-
fied beneficiaries. They have a fiduciary obligation to 
preserve the capital investment and obtain a fair return for 
the beneficiaries. 
The total monthly rent paid by appellant for 
September, 1972, through September, 1974, is contained in 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibits FF, GG and HH. After reducing the . 
amount by $25 for the monthly glassware rental, appellant 
paid $6,033.13 rent from October, 1972, to September, 1973, 
and $6,157.04 rent from October, 1973, to September, 1974. 
From these amounts, respondents paid $2,085.23 in taxes for 
1973 and an unknown amount for insurance, and they paid 
$2,030.80 for taxes in 1974 and $795 for insurance. This is 
a net investment return of $3,331.24 in 1974. Using the tax 
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assessor's fair market value of the premises of $162,900 for 
1974, this amounts to an annual return on invested capital 
of 2.04 percent. 
Raising the rents to $900 per month from October, 
1974, to September, 1975, would result in the receipt of 
$10,800 rent. After payment of 1975 taxes in the sum of 
$2,212.51 and insurance in the sum of $828, this would leave 
respondents with a net investment return of $3,042.51, or an 
annual return on invested capital of 4.76 percent. 
The trial court found, and appellant has not 
contested the findings, that: 
Mr. Van Antwerp invested approximately $15,000 
for the purchase of Continental's lease. He has not 
been as skilled an operator as Continental. He has 
seen a steady decline in gross sales and the number 
of patrons served. He has become discouraged. His 
books and records have never disclosed any profit or 
any possibility on the sales history up to date of 
paying him a reasonable wage for conducting the busi-
ness. He desires to be free of the leasehold obliga-
tion. He searches for an opportunity to recoup part 
of his original investment (Finding of Fact No. 51 
and Memorandum Decision at 5). 
Mr. Van Antwerp's desire to recoup part of his 
original investment in the Sublease has caused him 
to take the following position: 
(a) He believes that the only way he can 
achieve this is to remain in possession and 
thereby withhold from the plaintiffs a reasonable 
return on the ownership of the premises until he 
is paid a sum of money to leave. 
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(b) He insists that he is entitled to a 
renegotiated lease and cites the present sad 
state of gross sales to imply that the monthly 
rental for the first renewal term under the 
lease should be an even lower figure than he 
was paying at the time the lease expired (Find-
ing of Fact No. 52 and Memorandum Opinion at 
5, 6). 
By the time the first renewal term of the lease 
commenced, the restaurant business of Mr. Van Antwerp 
on the premises had failed, and he hoped to force the 
plaintiffs to buy out his interest in the lease (Find-
ing of Fact No. 53 and Memorandum Opinion at 6). 
It was never anticipated that the lease would be 
used for such a deceitful purpose (Finding of Fact No. 
54 and Memorandum Opinion at 6). 
All factors considered, the trial court correctly concluded 
that it was appellant who failed to renegotiate the monthly 
lease rental, not respondents. 
The respondents believe that the trial court gave 
consideration to all of the factors cited by appellant as a 
basis for fixing damages in terms of monthly rent and proper 
resolved the matter in favor of respondents. 
The cases cited by appellant are not in opposition 
to this conclusion. In Graseck v. Bankers Trust Company, 
315 Mich. 650, 24 N.W.2d 426 (1946), the trial court fixed 
the renewal term rentals at $275 per month. The plaintiff 
contended it should have been fixed at $125 per month, while 
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the defendant sought $350 per month. Both parties appealed. 
The trial court's finding was affirmed. 
At trial, testimony was introduced by defendant 
that "the then current rate of rentals in the vicinity of 
like properties . . . [was] considerably higher, [and] might 
seem presently to justify the fixing of a higher rate of 
rental." 
The appellate court did not increase the rental 
from $275 per month to $350 per month in favor of defendant, 
nor did it reduce the rental from $275 per month to $125 in 
favor of plaintiff. The court concluded that 
. . . the trial judge might well have been some-
what impressed by the testimony showing that in 1941 
there were negotiations relative to reduction of the 
$100 monthly rental provided in the lease under which 
plaintiff then occupied the premises; and also that the 
rental of a former tenant was reduced "because his 
business was such that he couldn't stand to pay $200.00 
per month;" and further by the fact that the fair 
rental value in a prospective five year lease is not 
necessarily controlled by presently prevailing high 
rentals. 
There is no indication in the opinion that testimony regarding 
the "current rate of rentals in the vicinity" for like 
property was inadmissible. The trial court judge may well 
have relied on such testimony, but relied on other factors 
pointed out by the appellate court in reducing said sum to 
arrive at the monthly rental. 
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Appellant has not introduced any evidence indi-
cating negotiations to further reduce the rental at the 
outset of this lease, or that the Hicks1 monthly rent was 
reduced, or that a fair rental for the renewal terra of the 
lease was other than what the trial court awarded. 
In Diettrich v. J. J. Newberry Co., 172 Wash. 18, 
19 P.2d 115, 117 (1933), the lessee had two leases on a 
single building. The ground and basement floors were leased 
pursuant to a five year lease, and the balance of the building 
was leased on a 25 year lease. It was the determination of 
a fair rental for the renewal option of the five year lease 
that concerned the court. The court concluded that the fair 
rental for the ground and basement floors of the building 
could not be determined by reference to the fair rental 
value of the entire building. The test for determining the 
renewal rent upon an extension of the five year lease 
is the reasonable rental value of the ground floor 
and basement taken alone for that specified period. . 
. . The amount of rent, therefore, was to be deter-
mined from competition that might arise between exclu-
sively responsible bidders in a fair and open market -
that is, by the market value of the premises at the 
time of renewal. IdL at 117. 
The rental could not exceed the highest rental market value 
of the leased premises. 
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The respondents have not leased contiguous property 
to the appellant and are not seeking to fix the rental value 
of one property based on a fair rental value of both proper-
ties. Consistent with the theory in both Gfaseck and 
Diettrich, they have introduced testimony of a real estate 
broker to show what other responsible restaurant owners are 
paying in terms of rent and to show what the other "respon-
sible bidders" would pay to rent this property "in a fair 
and open market.11 The broker testified that this would be 
somewhere between $800 and $1,000 per month, with the lessee 
paying all the taxes and insurance. 
I n
 Parsons v. Ball, 205 Ky. 793, 266 S.W. 649 
(1924), the lessee allowed the premises to fall into dis-
repair during the original lease term. The lessor would not 
recognize the lessee's renewal of the lease since the lessee 
had not kept the premises in good repair. The court recog-
nized the renewal option because tf[t]he contract does not 
provide in terms for forfeiture of the leased premises, or 
the lessee's rights under the lease, in case he fails to 
keep the houses in proper repair. . . ." Id., at 650. 
The lease before the court in Parsons does not 
even remotely resemble the lease before this Court. Not 
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only does appellant's lease have a forfeiture clause, but in 
event of breach of the repair covenants, it states "any such 
default shall, at the option of the Lessor, constitute a 
forfeiture . . ." (Para. 20 of Plaintiffs1 Exhibit A). 
In compliance with this paragraph, respondents 
served notice on appellant by letter dated September 24, 
1974, to correct the repair and maintenance deficiencies 
within 30 days after notice or the lease would be forfeited. 
No major repairs were undertaken by appellant, and by notice 
dated February 12, 1975, respondents declared a forfeiture 
of appellant's lease and gave him five days to vacate the 
premises, which he failed to do (Plaintiffs' Exhibits Q and 
R ) . . • • : . . . . . . • , : • : • , - ,;*-;' ^ - v , - , : : . . - , . 
Appellant contends that respondents' notice is 
defective and does not comply with Utah Code Ann. 1953, §78-
36-3. The Court's attention is directed to the form of 
forfeiture notices which were approved in Beneficial Life 
Insurance Company v. Dennett, 24 U.2d 310, 470 P.2d 406, 
407-08 (1970). Although those forfeiture notices were 
served to comply with paragraph 16(A) of a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, the respondents believe the same form of 
notices is applicable to a forfeiture declared pursuant to 
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paragraph 20 of the lease presently before the Court. These 
notices informed the appellant that the respondents elected 
to declare a forfeiture of the lease upon the failure of 
appellant to cure the defects and that appellant would, in 
the event of such a failure, become a tenant at will. They 
should be approved and confirmed in all respects. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CON-
CLUDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO TREBLE 
DAMAGES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, §78-36-10. 
The appellant admitted service of respondents1 
letter dated September 24, 1974, directing that certain 
repairs be undertaken within 30 days or the lease would be 
forfeited (Amended Complaint para. 18 and Amended Answer 
para. 17); admitted service of respondents' notice dated 
February 12, 1975 (Amended Complaint para. 21 and 22, 
Amended Answer para. 20 and 21); and admitted his refusal to 
vacate the premises pursuant to said notice (Amended Complaint 
para. 23, Amended Answer para. 22). The trial court found 
that the indicated repairs and maintenance had not been 
completed (Findings of Fact Nos. 34 and 35 and Memorandum 
Decision at 5-6) , found damages to be $4,000 (Finding of 
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Fact No. 39 and Memorandum Decision at 6), found appellant's 
failure to vacate wrongful and an unlawful holdover (Finding 
of Fact No. 56 and Memorandum Decision at 6-7), and found 
damages in the nature of rent after forfeiture to be $900 
per month (Finding of Fact No. 57 and Memorandum Decision at 
7 ) . '• 
The trial court considered but refused to find 
treble damages for the wrongful and unlawful holdover (Find-
ing of Fact No. 59 and Memorandum Decision at 7). The 
respondents believe this finding of the trial court is 
incorrect. Utah Code Annotated 1953, §78-36-10 states in 
part 
. . . judgment shall be rendered against the 
defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible or 
unlawful detainer, for rent and for three times the 
amount of damages thus assessed. 
This is the exact same language which the court 
had occasion to review in Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 
P. 206, 213 (1930). The court states 
This language has been held to require the entry 
of judgment for three times the amount of damages, 
after a finding of damages by the [court]. Eccles v. 
Union Pacific Coal Co., 15 Utah, 14, 48 P. 148. That 
action was one for forcible and unlawful detainer, but 
the statute applies as well to unlawful detainer. The 
statute as construed in Eccles v. U. P. Coal Co., 
supra, makes it mandatory upon the court to render 
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judgment for three times the amount of damages thus 
assessed. Ld. at 214. 
The court goes on to define what is meant by the term Mdamagesff 
which are trebled. The appellant correctly points out to 
the Court that such damages must be the natural and proxi-
mate consequence of the unlawful detainer (Brief of Appel-
lant at 17), but he failed to point out to the Court what 
those consequences were. The court in Forrester said 
The damages which may be recovered in an action 
such as this are measured by the rule that they must be 
the natural and proximate consequences of the acts 
complained of and nothing more. Rents and profits, or 
rental value of the premises, during detention are 
included in damages, (emphasis added), IcL at 211. 
The second claim for relief in respondents1 Amended 
Complaint deals strictly with the fact appellant refused to 
vacate the premises as directed. It is the unlawful deten-
tion of the premises which triggers the measure of damages. 
The court stated 
Clearly the loss of the value of the use and 
occupation of the premises, or the rental value thereof, 
during the period when the premises were unlawfully 
withheld from plaintiff, is a damage suffered by her. 
While damages may not be restricted to the rental value 
and may include more, yet the rental value during the 
unlawful withholding of possession is the minimum of 
damages. Ld. at 214. 
In this case, appellant was in unlawful detention 
from and after five days of service of respondents1 notice 
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on his legal counsel, or at the latest March 4, 1975. This 
unlawful detainer continued through January 15, 1976, when 
the sheriff served the Writ of Possession placing respondents 
in possession of the premises. 
So there would be no misunderstanding regarding 
damages, the court went on to distinquish ,!rents which 
accrued before forfeitureM from "damages accruing after 
forfeiture" based on the rental value of the unlawfully 
detained premises. It stated 
Rents, which may not be trebled, are such as 
accrue before termination of the tenancy. After the 
tenancy has been terminated by notice required by 
statute, the person in unlawful possession is not owing 
rent under the contract, but must respond in damages 
pursuant to law. Rental value or reasonable value of 
the use and occupation of the premises becomes an 
element of damages for retaining possession. This is 
not rent, it is damages. JA. at 214. 
Respondents have suffered additional damages as a 
natural and proximate result of appellant's unlawful holdover 
in that the condition of the premises continued to decline. 
The building exterior was not painted and the bare wood 
continued to weather, the public restroom and kitchen floors 
were not repaired, the kitchen walls continued to deteriorate 
from the moisture put out by the ice machine as a result of 
appellantfs refusal to relocate it, and the blocked off 
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restrooms continued to be exposed to the effects of inclement 
weather. Respondents were unable to correct these deficiencies 
as a result of appellant's refusal to vacate and had no oppor-
tunity so to do prior to January 15, 1975. 
The portion of the trial court's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree denying treble 
damages for unlawful detainer should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the trial court for the entry of appro-
priate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
and Decree awarding respondents the treble damages to which 
they were properly entitled. The respondents should be 
awarded their costs and a reasonable attorney's fee in con-
junction with this appeal, 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted: 
(a) The trial court erred as a matter of law 
in not concluding that the lease renewal option was void 
for vagueness and uncertainty. 
(b) The trial court erred as a matter of law 
in not awarding treble damages for unlawful detainer. 
(c) In all other respects, the trial court's 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and 
Decree should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN 
& EVANS 
Elwood P. Powell 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
Respondents, and Cross-
Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondents and Cross-Appellants was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Brian R. Florence, attorney for defendants, 
appellants, and cross-respondents, 818-26th Street, Ogden, 
Utah 84401, on the ^ ^ 4 day of July, 1976. 
^ ^ ~ < /V^-V 
- 44 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
